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Abstract 
Pipelines carrying oil and gas are very safe forms of energy transportation, but 
they do sometimes fail. 
  
In the Developed World these failures are usually associated with impact damage 
(e.g. from earth moving equipment), corrosion, or manufacturing faults in the 
pipeline materials. In the Developing World theft and sabotage is a major, and 
increasing cause of failure. Countries such as China, Mexico, and Nigeria have 
major problem with theft of pipeline products, sabotage, and vandalism. 
 
This paper reviews pipeline failures in Nigeria, focusing on pipelines carrying 
hydrocarbon liquids. The review clearly shows that theft/sabotage is the major 
cause of failure to pipelines, and the recorded failure rates (0.35 per km-year) are 
well above failure rates reported on other pipeline systems around the world. 
 
Fatalities from pipeline failures range from 0.04 to 0.38 per km-yr, depending on 
the region in Nigeria. Additionally, on average, the operator of the pipeline 
system considered in this paper loses about $US100million/year due to these 
failures. This value does not consider the costs associated with payment of 
compensation, fines, environmental clean-ups, litigation, etc. The paper 
concludes with recommendations to improve pipeline safety systems to reduce 
these fatalities and costs. 
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1 Introduction 
The transportation and distribution of liquid petroleum products in Nigeria is 
mainly by pipeline and road truck tankers[1]. Pipelines are generally considered 
the safest form of transporting energy, including petroleum products[2]. Hazards 
from pipeline operations are due to the possibilities of loss of containment 
(LOC) [3], with risks of fatality from fire and/or explosions, in addition to 
environmental damage. Pipeline risk should therefore be assessed in order to 
develop appropriate mitigation measures. 
1.1 Pipelines in Nigeria 
Fig. 1 shows the pipeline systems used for transporting petroleum products 
(mainly Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), Automated Gas Oil (AGO) and House 
Hold Kerosene (HHK)) in Nigeria. The pipeline system is strategically classified 
into five operational regions. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) own and operate the 5001 km asset through its subsidiary, the Pipeline 
Petroleum Marketing Company (PPMC). The PPMC pipeline network is made 
up of multiproduct systems for products supply: the buried pipelines link the 
refineries with distribution depots. There are 4 refineries in the country: one each 
in Kaduna and Warri; and two in Port-Harcourt, with a nameplate capacity of 
438,750 billion b/d. The Kaduna refinery is also linked to the Escravos terminal, 
through Warri, by a crude oil pipeline. The pipelines are divided into nine 
systems [4]. 
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Fig. 1. Map of Nigerian showing pipeline network and facilities [4]  
1.2 Risk Assessment of Pipelines 
A full risk assessment of a selected pipeline (such as the system in Fig. 1) is a 
complex task that may require specialist software (e.g. PHAST, EFFECT, 
SAFETI) [3] and risk expertise to interpret results correctly. There are a variety 
of different systems in use for identifying hazards, analysing failure likelihood or 
probabilities, evaluating failure consequences, and estimating risk values. These 
systems use qualitative or quantitative assessments to develop a suitable 
methodology. Palmer-Jones et al. [5] placed the systems into three generic 
methodologies: 
 point-scoring; 
 ranking; and, 
 quantified [6; 7].  
This paper considers these three methodologies, and tailors a method utilising 
analytical techniques that best suit risk assessment of the petroleum product 
pipelines in Nigeria. The results produced the risk management strategies we 
recommend in this study. 
1.3 Theft from Pipelines 
Pipelines carry many valuable fluids such as crude oil and gasoline: these 
products have high market values. In recent years, these products have been 
stolen from pipelines; for example, oil theft costs the Chinese oil industry more 
than $124.6m (2006 prices), and led to 2,877 arrests [8]. Also, in Mexico, crime 
groups stole fuel (crude oil, gasoline, diesel, LPG, etc.) estimated at $250 million 
(=3 million barrels) in the first 4 months of 2011. The criminals will make an 
estimated $750 million on stolen fuel this year. The heavily-armed gangs hijack 
trucks, and also siphon fuel directly from pipelines. The gangs have even built 
tunnels and their own pipelines to facilitate the thefts [9]. Associated Press[10] 
says: 
“In 2009, the U.S. Justice Department said U.S. refineries bought millions of 
dollars worth of oil stolen from Mexican government pipelines and smuggled 
across the border in illegal operations led by Mexican drug cartels expanding 
their reach.”  
 
The Developed World is also experiencing an increase in theft from pipelines 
[11]. Figures on liquid pipelines in Western Europe show an increase in theft 
from pipelines. Various factors contribute to theft/vandalism, e.g.: poverty; lack 
of basic services; corruption amongst government officials; etc. [12]. Oil theft in 
Nigeria (the Niger Delta) costs Shell up to $4.5bn a year in lost revenues. Theft 
(sometimes called ‘bunkering’) from oil pipelines is sophisticated, with a supply 
and demand chain. The loss of oil from this theft is estimated at 100,000 
barrels/day. This theft comes at huge cost. Examples of the human ‘cost’ of theft, 
in Nigeria include [8]: 
 Dec 2006: >260 killed in Lagos;    May 2006: >150 killed in Lagos; 
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 Dec 2004: >20 killed in Lagos; 
 Sept 2004: >60 killed in Lagos; 
 June 2003: >105 killed in Abia; 
 Jul 2000: >300 killed in Warri; 
 Mar 2000: >50 killed in Abia; 
  Oct 1998: >1,000 killed in Jesse. 
2 Methodology of pipeline risk assessment 
The methodology used for analysis of pipeline risk in this study draws relevant 
techniques from various frameworks. This combines both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to obtain results that overcome limitations in the data 
required for risk assessment of long pipelines, especially in developing countries. 
2.1 Establishing pipeline characteristics 
This involved collection of pipeline data to establish the general context of the 
pipeline. We obtained data related to the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of the pipeline from PPMC. Using this data, it was possible to 
establishing the characteristics of the pipeline and its operating parameters: 
including pipeline diameter, wall thickness, steel grade, length, fluid type, line 
capacity, design flow rate (min/max), design pressure, cathodic corrosion 
protection, depth of cover, etc. The details were used for various calculations. 
2.2 Risk analysis using historic data 
Historic incident data was obtained from the pipeline operator (NNPC, PPMC). 
The historic data used comprised data for 13 years (from 2000-2012) containing 
information on accidents and failures in the entire 5001km pipeline system 
across the 5 operations and distribution zones. This also includes details of 
fatalities, quantity and financial value of product loss, failure causal factors, etc. 
2.2.1 Failure frequencies 
Failure frequency is the likelihood that a hazard (pipeline failure) occurs. It is 
expressed in 1000 kilometre-years. Failure in a pipeline can occur due to a range 
of potential threats. These threats can be time dependent (e.g. internal/external 
corrosion and material fatigue), or time independent (e.g. ground movement, 
third party interference and incorrect operations). Failure of a high pressure 
pipeline can occur as a leak or rupture. Leaks are defined as fluid loss through a 
stable defect, while ruptures are fluid loss through an unstable defect which 
extends during failure, such that the release area is normally equivalent to two 
open ends [13].  
 
Failure frequency can be computed from historic data. For this study, we adopt 
and modify the model presented in De Stefani et al. [14] (see eqn. 1.). Failure 
frequency is therefore taken as the sum of reported failures f due to:  
 fTPD failure due to third party damage;  
 fMF failure from mechanical faults;  
 fCO failure from corrosion;  
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 fNH failure from natural hazard;, and,  
 fIN failure from ‘interdiction’ (sabotage and pilferage). 
 
𝑓 = 𝑓𝑇𝑃𝐷 +  𝑓𝑀𝐹 +  𝑓𝐶𝑂 +  𝑓𝑁𝐻 + 𝑓𝐼𝑁   (1) 
2.2.2 Consequence analysis 
Consequence analysis involves assessing the effects of accidents in order to 
determine the severity of pipeline failure. Using historic data, the consequence of 
releases are assessed at this stage. They include: ignition frequencies; fatality; 
volume loses; financial loses; and, environmental damage.  
2.2.3 Risk estimation. 
Risk estimation is expressed in terms of Societal (SR) and Individual Risk (IR). 
SR is a measure of risk to a group of people while IR is defined as a measure of 
the frequency at which an individual, at a specific distance from the pipeline, 
may be expected to sustain a specified level of harm from realisation of a 
specific hazard. IR measures have different values for a given incident or set of 
incidents. For this study, we assume an individual at a point x,y from the 
pipeline, and adopted the calculated failure frequencies from eqn. 1, and 
associated ignition frequencies to estimate a value of IR from point x,y with eqn. 
2. The inspected pipeline ROW in section 2.3 was used as a contextual 
framework for the calculations. 
𝐼𝑅(𝑥,𝑦)  = ∑  (𝑓. 𝑑𝑥. 𝑝𝑖 . 𝑝𝑐𝑦)𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1      (2) 
f = rupture frequency (per km-yr), pi = ignition probability, pcy = casualty 
probability, dx =step length (m) [6] 
2.3 Condition of Right of way – site survey 
To improve the contextual understanding of the pipeline, a site inspection was 
conducted on a section of the pipeline (system 2B - along the Mosimi to Atlas-
cove section) to obtained site specific data on the condition of right of way. The 
section of the pipeline inspected was selected due to its importance: 2B accounts 
for 70% of the product importation. In total, about 13km of that section was 
inspected over a period of four days (from 17
th
 to 20
th
 June, 2014). Details of the 
inspected coordinates are given in Table 1. The inspected area cuts across towns, 
villages and countryside. 
 
Table 1. Coordinates of section of pipeline ROW inspected 
Start point Coordinate:       6°35'00.4"N                  3°16'15.2"E 
End point Coordinate:        6°27'55.14"N                 3°15'14.91"E 
Distance:                            13.26 km 
Initial bearing:                    008°01′00″ 
Final bearing:                     008°01′07 
Midpoint:                           06°31′28″N,    003°15′45″E 
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3 Result and discussion 
3.1 Failure frequencies 
Table 2 shows the regions, the length pipelines, number of reported failures from 
year 2000 to 2012 and the computed failure frequency per Km year.  
 
Table 2. Failure frequencies within each NNPC distribution region  
Regions L (km) Failure 
incidents 
Failure frequencies 
per km year 
Port-Harcourt (PH) 1526.6 9246 0.47 
Warri (WR) 1561.2 4659 0.23 
Mosimi (MS) 512.6 3419 0.51 
Kaduna (KD) 1132.8 2443 0.17 
Gombe (GB) 267.8 2642 0.76 
 
The 13 years mean value of failure per km-year across the entire NNPC-PPMC 
pipeline network is 0.351 per km-year. This value is very high compared to 
failure frequencies from other international data source such as: 
 the  conservation of clean air and water in Europe  (CONCAWE) with a 
computed failure rate of 0.54E-3 and 0.24E-3 per km-yr from 1971 to 2011 
and 2007 to 2011 respectively; 
 UKOPA with failure frequency of 0.23E-3 per km-yr from 1962 to 2012; and 
US with failure rate of 0.135E-3 per km year from 1994 to 2012.  
There is therefore a need explore and understand the relationship between high 
failure rate in Nigeria and causal factors. 
 
Eqn. 1 gives the formula for computing failure classification based on causal 
factors. Failure data from 2000 to 2012 is represented in Table 3. Based on this 
data, natural hazards (fNH) is zero. The failure causal classification is limited to 
two types; 
1. Failure due to interdiction fIN – defined as the deliberate or intentional 
act of destruction on a system such as transport pipeline. This failure 
classification is believed to be a combination of failure from third party 
damage (fTPD) and fIN. 
2. Failure due to rupture, which is also believed to be a combination of 
manufacturing faults and corrosion (fMF and fCO).  
As expected fIN is the largest contributory factor. This failure causal factor has a 
mean contributory value of 96.49% of the pipeline failures while failure from 
rupture (i.e., fMF and fCO) accounts for 3.51% (see Table 3). Even if the data from 
interdiction is excluded from the analysis, failure frequency of the pipeline (from 
2000 to 2012) remains higher (0.00757) than what is reported internationally. 
Care needs to be taken in interpreting this result as it does not give in-depth 
details of causal factors. For instance, the term ‘rupture’ was given as a failure 
cause without regards to its technical definition. 
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fIN has assumed various dimensions within the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
Consequently, various terms such as ‘oil theft’, ‘bunkering’, ‘fuel scooping’,  
‘pipeline sabotage’, and ‘oil terrorism’ have been used to describe the act of 
illegal tampering to the pipelines. The trend of product pipeline interdiction has 
evolved in the recent years with possible links to socio-political events. For 
instance, the likely reason for the increase between 2004 to 2005 (see Fig. 2) – 
the largest in absolute terms – is possibly linked to reported failures to fulfil 
promises made by politicians to the population before the 2003 general elections, 
especially in the Niger Delta. The increase is mostly influenced by the upsurge in 
interdiction within the Port-Harcourt region, which forms part of the Niger-Delta 
[4]. 
 
Table 3. Yearly % failure contributory factors 
Year 
Absolute 
F(Interdiction) 
F(in)% 
Contribution 
Absolute 
F(Rupture) 
F(Rup) % 
contribution 
2000 984 87.78 137 12.22 
2001 461 94.66 26 5.34 
2002 516 95.20 26 4.80 
2003 779 94.20 48 5.80 
2004 895 92.17 76 7.83 
2005 2237 99.07 21 0.93 
2006 3674 99.76 9 0.24 
2007 3224 99.38 20 0.62 
2008 2285 98.58 33 1.42 
2009 1453 98.18 27 1.82 
2010 836 97.21 24 2.79 
2011 2768 99.32 19 0.68 
2012 2230 98.85 26 1.15 
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Fig. 2. Total National absolute number of interdiction and % change 
The drop in national interdiction figure within 2006 to 2010 may be attributed to 
the amnesty granted to ex-militants by the Nigerian Government. The 
programme appears to have substantially reduced interdiction until 2010. From 
2010 to 2011, interdiction increased over 200%, making it the highest national 
percentage increase on record. This was the period of general elections. It is 
therefore noted that interdiction and failure frequencies on pipelines in Nigeria 
may be influenced by socio-political events. With this knowledge, security can 
be enhanced along the pipeline as periods of general elections approach. 
3.2 Failure frequency and age of pipeline 
The pipeline systems were constructed in two periods: 1978/80 and 1995. From 
Table 4 it can be seen that there is a significant difference between failures from 
interdiction across the two construction periods. The newer lines have a higher 
hit rate. This reveals that interdictors attack lines irrespective of the age of the 
pipeline. Failure due to rupture increased with pipeline age; unfortunately, the 
available data did not permit further analysis to ascertain the precise 
relationships (i.e., whether the failure is related to time dependent threats (e.g. 
internal/external corrosion and material fatigue) or time independent (e.g., 
ground movement and incorrect operations). 
Table 4. Pipeline age and mean failure frequency. Note that fIN is failure due to 
interdiction and fRup is failure due to rupture 
Variable N(yrs) Mean StDev Minimum Maximum 
FIN (1995) 13 0.493 0.428 0.057 1.180 
FIN (1978/80) 13 0.765 1.065 0.000 3.208 
fRup (1995) 13 0.02011 0.01230 0.00390 0.03902 
fRup (1978/80) 13 0.00203 0.00365 0.00000 0.01132 
3.3 Consequence analysis 
The consequence of pipeline failure are examined in this Section. 
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3.3.1 Ignition causes and frequencies (pi) 
Failure records from 2007 had causes of ignition. Prior to 2007, only the number 
of ignitions recorded per year were reported. Of the 106 ignitions recorded from 
2007 to 2012, about 75% were as a result of (Fig. 3 ): 
 deliberate arson after scooping fuel; 
 unintentional fire as a result of scooping; or, 
 bomb attack.  
 
Most of the sources of fire from mechanical faults are not clearly reported; 
however, one incident was attributed to sudden rupture. Third party damage is 
not a major causal factor, but sparks from electric overhead cables, bush burning 
for hunting purposes, and construction activities were mostly the source of fire 
from third part damage. From Table 5  it can be seen that Port-Harcourt region 
(PH), Warri (WR), Mosimi (MS) and Kaduna regions all have ignition per 
failure incidents within the same range (i.e., about 1 in 50), while Gombe (GB) 
region recorded the lowest ignition frequency of approximately 1 in 100 reported 
failures. 
 
There are questions as to the reason why ignition rate is high in PH, WR and MS 
regions. Perhaps this could be associated to the type of technology used in illegal 
hot tapping, or the flash point of the product involved. However, emergency 
response capability can be enhanced to reduce such incidents with this 
information. Leak detection and incident response technologies should focus on 
the high risk regions. 
 
Fig. 3. Ignition causal factors 
Table 5. Ignition frequencies within NNPC-PPMC distribution regions 
Regions 
Pipeline failure 
(2000 to 2012) 
Fire incidents (2000 to 
2012) 
Ignition 
frequency 
PH 9246 206 2.23E-02 
WR 4659 122 2.62E-02 
Vandals 
74% 
Mechanical 
faults 
[PERCENTAGE] 
TPD 
5% 
Unknown 
17% 
Vandals Mechcanical faults TPD Unknown
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MS 3419 76 2.22E-02 
KD 2443 50 2.05E-02 
GB 2642 27 1.02E-02 
3.3.2 Fatality  
The fatality of a pipeline failure within each distribution region (as represented in 
Table 6) can be determined. No fatality has been recorded from pipeline failures 
in GB and KD regions, while on average, the pipeline systems in PH, WR and 
MS regions recorded fatality of 0.044, 0.071 and 0.38 per km-yr. These fatality 
rates could be a direct function of the high ignition frequencies within these 
regions. However, surprisingly, KD region recorded no fatality even though the 
ignition frequency in that region is similar to ignition frequencies in PH, WR and 
MS. 
 
Table 6. Fatalities from 1998 to 2012. Updating from Anifowose et al. (2012) 
Regions Fatality report (1998 to 2012) 
PH 1004 
WR 1665 
MS 2889 
KD 0 
GB 0 
This suggests that other influencing factors (as discovered during the pipeline 
right of way inspection) may include the proximity of buildings to the pipeline, 
incident response time, ease of access to incident sites, as well as the flash point 
of the product involved 
3.3.3 Product losses and financial values 
The scale of problem of product losses can be seen in financial terms in Fig. 4. 
From this figure, the spike in 2005-2006 and 2011-2012 may be related to the 
political issues discussed in section 2.1.  On average, the operator loses about 
100million USD per year. This value does not even considers cost associated to 
payment of compensation, fines, environmental clean ups, litigation, etc.   
  
 
Fig. 4. Dollar value of product loss 
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3.4 Individual risk based on historic data 
 
Fig. 5. Pipeline IR values 
Fig. 5 illustrates the calculated IR associated with the section of the pipeline 
inspected. The figure also illustrates the IR limits established by BSI PD8010-3 
[13]. At about 40m from the pipeline, the IR value is not within the BSI PD 
tolerable limits. Above 40m the IR value is tolerable if the risk is ALARP. The 
ROW inspection conducted reveals that in many cases buildings and other public 
infrastructures are located less that a meter from the pipeline. This may be the 
reason for the high fatality rates. 
4 Conclusion 
The risk associated with the Nigerian petroleum product pipelines was assessed 
using historic data and site data. The failure frequency of the pipelines was found 
to be extremely high (0.351 per km-yr) when compared to failure frequencies of 
international pipelines (e.g., the UK and USA). This is mainly due to pipeline 
interdiction. Consequently, the ignition frequencies, fatality, and product losses 
from the Nigerian pipelines are found to be high. This ultimately made the 
values of Individual Risk for these pipelines to fall outside tolerable limits.  
 
Although we recognise that the poor safety performance of the pipelines are 
influenced by wider socio-political issues in Nigeria, the information provided 
via this assessment, and some concepts of engineering and pipeline risk and 
integrity management, can help in managing and optimising the performance of 
the pipeline. Hence, in Section 5 we make recommendations to improve the 
pipeline’s safety and environmental management system. 
1.4E-03 1.4E-03 
6.3E-04 
3.6E-04 
2.0E-04 
0.0E+00 
0.0E+00
2.0E-04
4.0E-04
6.0E-04
8.0E-04
1.0E-03
1.2E-03
1.4E-03
1.6E-03
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 R
is
k 
p
er
 y
ea
r 
y distance from pipeline 
IR acceptable limits ALARP (public) ALARP (worker)
12 
 
5 Risk management recommendations 
1. The pattern of interdiction on these pipelines reveals how the pipeline 
industry is affected by socio-political issues. Therefore, these issues should 
be an integral part of the pipeline risk management. To better understand the 
dynamics of these issues, a detailed Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) should be conducted across the entire network. 
Aggrieved communities should be identified, a royalty payment system 
should be designed as compensation to land owners, and community incident 
reporting/response system should be enhanced using the ‘one-call’ system. 
2. Inline inspections and air surveillance systems should be designed and 
implemented. Inspection can be carried out internally by X-ray or Gamma 
ray crawlers or intelligent pigs.  These enable the detection of internal and 
external corrosion, drill holes, and cracks within the wall of the pipeline. 
They mainly rely on ultrasonic and magnetic flux leakage to detect the 
defects. The intervals of inspection and frequencies of surveillance can be 
extrapolated from the assessed pattern of failure frequencies in this study. 
Surveillance should be vigorous, especially in political election years. 
3. Optical intrusion electronic detection systems can be used to monitor 
activities of interdictors. The system includes a fibre optic, usually installed 
12 to 24 inch above the pipeline. Should the cable become damaged, the 
monitoring device issues an alarm to the pipeline logic controller and/or the 
supervisory control and data acquisition system. Appropriate response can 
then be initiated. 
4. Public education needs to be enhanced. Individuals (especially within 
intolerable risk zone) should be educated about the hazardous nature of 
petroleum products, pipeline dangers, and appropriate emergency responses. 
5. The pipelines’ rights of way need to be properly maintained. 
Encroachment of buildings should be stopped, with strict regulations and 
appropriated land compensations. This will reduce third party activities, and 
also enhance effective incident responses. 
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